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1 Introduction
Today’s users typically have a multitude of electronic devices, such as desktop
and laptop computers, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and mobile/cellular
phones, each with the capability to communicate with one another. At the
same time, wireless communication has become more affordable and pervasive,
and we have seen the introduction of smaller wireless-enabled devices such as
headsets and headphones. In the future, the widespread use of sensor devices
for a variety of monitoring applications is expected to become commonplace.
A set of user devices is likely to use a range of, possibly incompatible, com-
munication technologies, such as IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet), IEEE 802.11 (WLAN),
Bluetooth and infrared. Regardless of the available communication methods,
users and service providers will both require global Internet connectivity.
Managing such a heterogenous environment is a complex problem, and cur-
rent services are singular in nature — a service is provided to a single user,
and typically to only one device. The synergy of user devices is not utilised
in any way, which means additional management effort for the user. However,
as user devices become more capable, at least in terms of communication and
computation, new approaches are needed.
The Mobile Virtual Centre of Excellence (Mobile VCE)1 has been conduct-
ing research aimed at such future technologies, with the goal of developing novel
means of providing future mobile services. The underlying goal is to help deliver
ubiquitous services, by providing technology that enables content and service
providers to support multimedia applications over a range of access network
technologies (including ad hoc networks), each with its own capabilities for ser-
vice delivery. To further enhance user experience, and to reduce the complexity
for users, a new model for personal distributed computing, called a ‘Personal
1See www.mobilevce.com.
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Distributed Environment’ (PDE) [2, 15], has been proposed. A PDE is a ‘virtual
network’ of a user’s devices, providing the tools to assist the user to manage
their PDE.
Inevitably, in this new environment users are vulnerable to a variety of secu-
rity threats and attacks. In order to fully realise the Mobile VCE vision, sound
security solutions are crucial for the widespread adoption of PDE-based ubiq-
uitous services. Users are becoming increasingly concerned about their online
privacy [6, 7], and the potential risks (such as identity theft) of leaving any form
of digital trail when making electronic transactions. Given a choice, users may
prefer to remain anonymous when interacting with other entities.
Trusted Computing (TC)2 offers a range of security functionality that can
be used to help meet the objective of enhancing the security of future mobile
ubiquitous environments. Trusted computing is a technology that has been
developed to improve the security of computing platforms in increasingly het-
erogenous environments. This objective is realised through the incorporation
of a hardware component, known as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), into
computing platforms. The TPM provides the ‘trusted platform’ with a foun-
dation of trust (so-called ‘roots of trust’) as well as the basis on which a suite
of TC security functionality can be built. As a result, users can gain greater
assurance that the platform with which they are interacting is behaving in the
expected manner [3, 45].
In this chapter, we show how trusted computing mechanisms can be used
to develop services to enhance the security of a PDE, to secure the process of
service discovery in a mobile ubiquitous environment, and to support anonymous
watermarking for content distribution protection. While this chapter presents
solutions that use trusted computing technology in the context of a PDE, the
general approaches we present are likely to be of use in a more general context,
such as in peer-to-peer networks [4, 5] to address the problem of Sybil Attacks.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
ubiquitous environment, provides more details about the PDE architecture, and
describes the processes involved in the provision of ubiquitous services. Section 3
contains an overview of trusted computing and the security functionality that is
applied later in this chapter. Section 4 provides an overview of the security issues
surrounding the use and provision of PDEs. Section 5 addresses the problem of
securing service discovery, and section 6 considers anonymous watermarking for
content distribution detection. Finally, in section 7 we provide some concluding
remarks.
2 The Mobile Ubiquitous Environment
The Mobile VCE vision of future mobile ubiquitous computing has the following
characteristics:
2See www.trustedcomputinggroup.org for further details, including the Trusted Computing
Group specifications.
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• users own multiple devices of varying capabilities,
• users (and their devices) are highly mobile, and
• users communicate using a variety of different wireless network access
technologies.
This leads to an environment of the type shown in Figure 1. Such an envi-
ronment has three fundamental components — users, network technology, and
service providers.
Figure 1: A mobile ubiquitous computing environment
The diversity of network technology will help to realise the Mobile VCE vi-
sion of ubiquitous computing, although addressing this heterogeneity is beyond
the scope of this chapter. Instead, we focus on the two end-parties, users and ser-
vice providers, and introduce the key concepts underpinning this environment.
In the ongoing Mobile VCE Core 4 programme of research into Ubiquitous Ser-
vices3, it is envisaged that users will be able to seamlessly discover and access a
rich offering of services and content, from a wide choice of service and content
providers, via their mobile devices; any necessary switching between network
technologies should be transparent to the user.
As discussed above, Mobile VCE has developed a model encompassing a
user’s diverse range of communication devices, called the ‘Personal Distributed
Environment’ [2, 15]. In section 2.1, we introduce the key concepts of a PDE.
A PDE will assist in the delivery of new ubiquitous services, central to these
new dynamic environments. In section 2.2, we examine two key issues surround-
ing the provision of these ‘anywhere-anytime’ services — service discovery and
content distribution protection.
2.1 Personal Distributed Environments
A PDE is an overlay networking concept that allows a user to form a ‘virtual
network’ consisting of the networked devices that the user owns, or is autho-
3See www.mobilevce.com.
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rised to use. The capabilities of these devices will typically vary in terms of
computational power, energy source, mobility, communication and network in-
terfaces, and may reside in different physical locations. Other related overlay
architectures, similar to the PDE concept, include those described in [36, 39, 40].
2.1.1 PDE scenario
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a PDE consisting of devices that the user
owns, ‘home devices’, and also third-party devices that the user may or may
not have pre-established rights to access — these are called ‘foreign devices’ in
PDE terminology.
The shaded ovals represent the user’s subnetworks, and the ovals
with dashed outlines show foreign devices that are connected to the
user’s PDE.
Figure 2: A Personal Distributed Environment
For example, a user may have a home network consisting of a desktop com-
puter, a printer and an ADSL connection for Internet access. Also at home
might be the user’s digital set-top box and satellite receiver used to receive dig-
ital broadcasts. At work, the user might also have a desktop computer that is
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connected to the corporate network, allowing access to foreign devices such as
corporate servers, applications, etc., that the user is authorised to access and
use, possibly remotely.
In addition to the home and work environments, a user may also have a num-
ber of mobile environments. The user’s car may have an intelligent networking
capability enabling it to retrieve satellite navigation data and traffic news via
satellite or ad hoc network communications. A user may also carry smaller de-
vices, such as a mobile phone, PDA, and a laptop — these home devices can
communicate to form a Personal Area Network (PAN). It is further envisaged
that additional foreign devices may connect to the PAN on an ad hoc basis.
These could, for example, include a display monitor on a train, allowing a user
to view content on a larger screen, a printer in an airport lounge, or perhaps the
devices of another user’s PDE used to transfer data or play computer games.
This example illustrates how heterogenous networks and devices can be inte-
grated to form a PDE. While this results in additional complexity, the diversity
of technologies can be used to deliver ubiquitous services to the user, where the
most capable devices and communications means available are selected.
2.1.2 PDE management
Given the potential complexity of a PDE, there must be a way for a user to
manage a PDE in a simple and intuitive way. This is achieved through a semi-
distributed construct called the Device Management Entity (DME). The pri-
mary task for the DME is to intelligently select the most appropriate device
for service delivery, acting as a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [46] proxy to
redirect session setup requests. In order to perform this task, the DME requires
the following functional components:
• Equipment register,
• Location register, and
• Security register.
The equipment register records and stores the capabilities of devices as they
are initialised and registered with the PDE. The location register maintains
the location of each PDE device. The security registry stores information and
data used to support PDE security functionality — this is discussed further in
section 4.
As stated previously, a user’s PDE may consist of a number of subnetworks
in disparate locations. For reasons of efficiency and scale, DME functions are
distributed to a ‘local DME’ within each subnetwork, each reporting to a root
DME. This effectively creates a two layer management hierarchy.
It is proposed that the root DME will normally reside on the most capable
device in a static subnetwork, such as the user’s home desktop or, perhaps
preferably, an online PDE service provider that the user has subscribed to [50].
Since the DME provides the features that enable a PDE, ensuring its availability
is extremely important.
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Within each PDE subnetwork, the most capable device is chosen as the local
DME. In the case of mobile subnetworks the local DME selection process is
dynamic, since one of the fundamental factors influencing capability is residual
energy. Atkinson et al. [2] have proposed a broadcast-based protocol to discover
the local, home, DME-capable device with the most residual energy — also
included in their proposal is a handover protocol to move control of the local
DME between devices.
In section 4 we discuss how the security issues arising in a PDE might be
addressed using trusted computing functionality.
2.2 Ubiquitous Services
In a ubiquitous setting, as shown in Figure 1, a central user goal is to be able to
seamlessly access ubiquitous services (or content) at any time, and anywhere,
via a user device (in the user’s PDE). For example, a subscriber to digital sports
content may wish to watch live, streamed action of a football game, while on
the move.
Recent advances in wireless networking technologies (such as WiFi, WiMax,
Bluetooth, ZigBee, UWB), coupled with the ever increasing computation and
communication capabilities of small form factor devices, have made such a vision
a reality. These technological advances, however, have also introduced new
security challenges and vulnerabilities. Existing security solutions are not well
suited to a mobile ubiquitous environment, because of the dynamic and highly
mobile nature of users and their devices. Of particular concern are the following.
1. As users roam and move about, they may need to interact with other enti-
ties from different administrative or security domains. To facilitate secure
communications, or to establish some form of trust between two entities
with no prior service interactions, online access to a trusted third party
(TTP) may be required (e.g. in a PKI setting). This task is particularly
difficult in a dynamic environment.
2. User devices are typically resource constrained because of their small form
factor, and thus may not be capable of performing computationally in-
tensive cryptographic operations (e.g. performing public key algorithms).
Lightweight solutions may need to be devised.
3. One other problem which is exacerbated by this new communications
medium is that of content distribution protection. The mobile ubiqui-
tous environment not only allows content and service providers to reach
a big pool of users and customers with greater ease, but similarly allows
content pirates and illegal content distribution activities to flourish.
Whilst numerous security issues arise in a mobile ubiquitous environment,
we focus here on two particularly important issues for service interactions be-
tween users and service providers, namely secure service discovery and content
distribution protection.
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2.2.1 Service Discovery
O’Sullivan et al. [41] define a Service as: ‘An action performed by an entity
on behalf of another and this action involves the transfer of value’. In the
context of a mobile ubiquitous environment, examples of a service may include
streaming of digital broadcast content, online network gaming, etc. to multiple
users and their devices. Against this backdrop, Service Discovery can thus be
defined as: ‘The act or process of finding and locating such services in the
network environment’. Since a value (which may not always be monetary, e.g.
reputation) is attached to a service, it is important that measures are taken to
protect and secure the service discovery process.
Service discovery typically takes place immediately prior to service provi-
sioning. Many different service discovery mechanisms have been proposed (such
as Java Jini [53], UPnP [56], SLP [25], DEAPspace [38] and Salutation [48]),
but few address the issue of security and privacy. Regardless of the type of
service discovery mechanism employed, a typical service discovery process nor-
mally involves the exchange of service messages (i.e. service advertisements and
service requests) between a service user and a service provider. These messages,
if divulged to an eavesdropper, may reveal information about a service user (e.g.
the type of services that a user is accessing or searching). It is therefore impor-
tant that the process of service discovery be conducted in such a way that user
security and privacy is protected. Similarly, a service discovery scheme should
also protect service providers from rogue users.
In section 5, we discuss in greater detail the security issues arising from
service discovery. We describe one way in which trusted computing function-
ality can be used to protect and secure the process of service discovery whilst
preserving user privacy.
2.2.2 Content Distribution Protection
Illegal distribution of copyrighted digital content (e.g. music and movies) through
new communications media poses a major challenge to the digital content in-
dustries. The challenge for content providers is how to prevent or deter illegal
distribution of copyrighted materials, whilst embracing new opportunities (e.g.
a more efficient distribution channel to reach a bigger customer pool) presented
by a mobile ubiquitous environment.
One way of deterring illegal content distribution is for the content provider to
embed a unique ‘watermark’ into every piece of content. If unauthorised copies
of the content are found, then this watermark should enable the content provider
to trace this copy of the content back to the original buyer. Such an approach
suffers from two problems. Firstly, an honest buyer may be wrongly accused
(framed) of unauthorised distribution (e.g. if the content provider matches the
wrong identity to the suspect copies of the content). Secondly, it is also possible
for a malicious buyer to claim that an unauthorised copy was in fact leaked by
the content provider.
To address these problems, two types of content distribution protection
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(CDP) scheme have been proposed to protect the interests of both buyers and
sellers, namely, Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) schemes [34] and Asymmet-
ric Fingerprinting (AF) schemes [43]. These schemes require content to include
a buyer watermark in addition to a watermark generated by the seller. Several
anonymous BSW and AF schemes [10, 13, 27, 30, 44] have also been proposed,
with the goal of preserving a buyer’s privacy.
In BSW schemes, a TTP generates buyer watermarks, while in the AF
schemes a buyer generates his/her own watermark, which is proven to be well-
formed to the content provider (using zero-knowledge proofs). Both these ap-
proaches prevent an honest buyer from being framed, as well as a malicious
buyer from denying that he/she has illegally distributed copyrighted content. If
buyer privacy is desired, then a TTP can be employed to provide buyers with
certified pseudonyms.
The requirement for an (online) TTP in existing BSW and AF schemes,
either to generate the buyer watermarks or to provide pseudonyms for buyers,
represents a major constraint, especially in a mobile ubiquitous environment,
where online TTPs may not always be readily available. It is clearly important
to try to remove this constraint, so that the schemes are more scalable and
suitable for use in distributed environments (see section 1).
Trusted computing functionality can be used to meet this objective. In
section 6 we describe one way of building an anonymous watermarking scheme
for content distribution protection that exploits this functionality. This scheme
minimises reliance on a TTP for privacy protection, as the buyer can generate
verifiable pseudonyms on its own. As a result, the communication overheads are
reduced, and the overall efficiency, compared to existing BSW and AF schemes,
improved. Also, through the use of TC functionality, the content provider is
able to obtain assurance that a buyer-generated watermark is well formed.
3 Introduction to Trusted Computing
Trusted computing, as developed by the Trusted Computing Group4 (TCG), is
a technology designed to enhance the security of computing platforms. This ob-
jective is achieved through the incorporation of trusted hardware functionality,
or so called ‘roots of trust’, into platforms. As a result, users can gain greater
assurance that the platform with which they are interacting is in the expected
configuration [3, 35, 55].
As briefly discussed above, the trusted hardware functionality is provided
by a special hardware component called the TPM, embedded into a host plat-
form. The TPM provides the platform with a foundation of trust, as well as
the basis on which a suite of trusted computing security functionality is built.
The TPM and its host are collectively referred to as a Trusted Platform, and
provide a set of commands, or Protected Capabilities, with exclusive access to
shielded locations. Shielded locations are areas (memory, registers, etc.) where
4http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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sensitive data, including cryptographic keys, can be processed with guarantees
of confidentiality. Protected capabilities also enable the following functionality.
• Integrity measurement enables a Trusted Platform to record events that
modify its state, in the form of integrity metrics.
• Integrity measurement provides a mechanism for a Trusted Platform to
measure its own integrity at start-up, and, as a consequence, a means to
authenticate that it has booted to a certain state.
• Sealed storage covers the ability to bind data objects, including crypto-
graphic keys, to specific platform states, verified by the authenticated boot
process.
• The use of integrity metrics is not restricted to internal use — a Trusted
Platform can attest to its measured platform configuration to an external
entity (or verifier).
The functions of Integrity Measurement, Storage and Reporting (IMSR) can
be used to determine the software state of a trusted platform; this information
can then be used to make an assessment of a platform’s trustworthiness.
Other TPM protected capabilities include the following.
• A TPM provides cryptographic key management functions such as key
generation, random number generation, an RSA engine and a SHA-1 en-
gine.
• Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) are 2048-bit RSA keys associated with
TPM-generated platform aliases, that can be used to interact pseudony-
mously with external entities. Trust in AIKs is provided through the use
of an AIK credential (public key certificate), provided by a trusted third
party called a Privacy-CA.
• The reliance on Privacy-CAs may not be appropriate for applications
where strong unlinkability guarantees are required. Hence, the Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) signature scheme is also provided, which
provides additional anonymity protection for a trusted platform.
We describe the IMSR functions and DAA signature scheme in sections 3.2
and 3.3, respectively. We first give an introduction to the various types of key
used by a TPM (section 3.1). The descriptions below are based upon v1.2 of
the TCG TPM specifications [55].
3.1 TPM Keys and Identities
Each TPM has a unique 2048-bit RSA key pair called the Endorsement Key
(EK). The EK is likely to be generated by the TPM manufacturer, and the EK
private key, together with a certificate for the corresponding public key, can be
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used to prove that a genuine TPM is contained in a platform. However, since a
TPM only has one such key pair, a TPM can be uniquely identified by its EK.
The EK is therefore only used in very special circumstances. A TPM can,
however, generate an arbitrary number of 2048-bit RSA Attestation Identity
Key (AIK) key pairs, which are used for interacting with other entities. AIKs
function as pseudonyms for a trusted platform, and platform privacy can be
achieved by using a different AIK to interact with different entities. In order to
prove that a particular AIK originates from a genuine TPM, a platform has to
prove that the AIK public key is associated with a genuine trusted platform; this
involves use of the EK in an exchange with a trusted third party in such a way
that the AIK cannot be linked with a particular EK, even by the trusted third
party that sees the EK public key. The DAA protocol (discussed in section 3.3)
is used to support this process.
3.2 Integrity Measurement, Storage and Reporting
Integrity Measurement, Storage and Reporting (IMSR) is one of the key features
of trusted computing. IMSR builds upon the three ‘roots of trust’ in a trusted
platform, namely, the root of trust for measurement (RTM), the root of trust for
storage (RTS), and the root of trust for reporting (RTR). Together, they allow
a verifier to learn the exact operational state of a platform, and hence obtain
evidence of a platform’s behaviour. This functionality is extremely important
as a platform may potentially enter one of a wide range of operational states,
including those that are insecure and undesirable.
3.2.1 Integrity Measurement
IMSR begins with the process of integrity measurement. The RTM, a computing
engine in the TPM, measures the platform’s operational state and character-
istics. The measured values, known as integrity metrics, convey information
about the platform’s current state (and hence trustworthiness).
3.2.2 Integrity Storage
Details of exactly which measurements have been performed are stored in a
file called the Stored Measurement Log (SML). Using the RTS, a digest (i.e.
a cryptographic hash computed using Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) [37])
of the integrity metrics is saved in one of the TPM’s internal registers, called
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs).
The SML contains the sequence of all measured events, and each sequence
shares a common measurement digest. Since an SML may become fairly large,
it does not reside in the TPM. Integrity protection for the SML is not nec-
essary, since it functions as a means to interpret the integrity measurements
in the PCRs, and any modifications to the SML will cause subsequent PCR
verifications to fail.
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There are only a limited number of PCRs in the TPM to hold the mea-
surement digests. So, in order to ensure that previous and related measured
values are not ignored/discarded, and the order of operations is preserved, new
measurements are appended to a previous measurement digest, re-hashed, and
then put back into the relevant PCR. This technique is known as extending the
digest, and operates as follows:
PCRi [n]← SHA-1 (PCRi−1 [n] ||New integrity metric),
where PCRi[n] denotes the content of the nth PCR after i extension operations,
and || denotes the bit string concatenation operator.
The processes of integrity measuring and storage can be used by a trusted
platform to authenticate its boot process — at each stage of the boot process
a measurement is taken of the components required for the subsequent stage,
before control is passed to those measured components [24] (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: An example of an authenticated boot process
3.2.3 Integrity Reporting
The final phase of the IMSR process is Integrity Reporting. The RTR has two
main responsibilities during Integrity Reporting:
1. to retrieve and provide a challenger with the requested integrity metrics
(i.e. the relevant portion of the SML, and the corresponding PCR values);
and
2. to attest to (prove) the authenticity of the integrity metrics to a challenger
by signing the PCR values using one of the TPM’s AIK private keys.
To verify the integrity measurements, the verifier computes the measurement
digest (using the relevant portion of the SML), compares it with the correspond-
ing PCR values, and checks the signature on the PCR values. The process of
integrity reporting is also often referred to as Attestation.
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3.3 Direct Anonymous Attestation
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [8, 9] is a special type of signature scheme
that can be used to anonymously authenticate a TCG v1.2 compliant platform
to a remote verifier. The key feature that DAA provides is the capability for a
TPM (a prover) to convince a remote verifier that:
• it is indeed a genuine TPM (and hence it will behave in a trustworthy
manner) without revealing any unique identifiers;
• an AIK public key is held by a TPM, without allowing multiple verifiers
to collude and link transactions involving different AIKs from the same
platform.
The above-mentioned features help to protect the privacy of a TPM user.
Another important feature of DAA is that the powers of the supporting TTP
(the DAA Issuer) are minimised, as it cannot link the actions of users (even
when it colludes with a verifier), and hence compromise the user’s privacy.
DAA works by allowing a prover to anonymously convince a remote verifier
that it has obtained an anonymous attestation credential, or DAA Certificate
(a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature [11]) from a specific DAA Issuer (At-
tester). The DAA Certificate also serves to provide the implicit ‘link’ between
an EK and an AIK. The DAA scheme is made up of two sub-protocols: DAA
Join and DAA Sign. We now provide a short description of these two sub-
protocols [8].
3.3.1 DAA Join Protocol
The DAA Join protocol enables the TPM to obtain a DAA Certificate (also
known as an anonymous attestation credential) from a DAA Issuer. The Join
protocol is based on the CL signature scheme [11].
Let (n, S, Z,R) be the public key of the DAA Issuer, where n is an RSA
modulus, and S, Z and R are integers modulo n. We assume that the platform
(TPM) is already authenticated to the DAA Issuer via its Endorsement Key,
EK.
The platform (TPM) first generates a DAA secret value, f , and makes a
commitment to f by computing U = RfSv
′
mod n, where v′ is a value chosen
randomly to ‘blind’ f . The platform (TPM) also computes NI = ζ
f
I mod Γ,
where ζI is derived from the DAA Issuer’s name, and Γ is a large prime. The
platform (TPM) then sends (U,NI) to the DAA Issuer, and convinces the DAA
Issuer that U and NI are correctly formed (using a Zero Knowledge Proof [20,
21]). If the DAA Issuer accepts the proof, it will sign the hidden message,
U , by computing A = ( Z
USv′′
)1/e mod n, where v′′ is a random integer and e
is a random prime. The DAA Issuer then sends the platform (i.e. the TPM)
the triple (A, e, v′′), and proves that A was computed correctly. The DAA
Certificate is then (A, e, v = v′ + v′′).
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3.3.2 DAA Sign Protocol
The DAA Sign protocol allows a platform to prove to a verifier that it is in
possession of a DAA Certificate, and, at the same time, to sign and authenticate
a message.
The platform signs a message, m, using its DAA Secret, f , its DAA Cer-
tificate, and the public parameters of the system. The message, m, may be an
Attestation Identity Key (AIK) generated by the TPM, or an arbitrary message.
The platform also computes NV = ζf mod Γ as part of the signature computa-
tion (the selection of ζ will be discussed in the next section). The output of the
Sign protocol is known as the DAA Signature, σ.
The verifier verifies the DAA Signature, σ, and, on successful verification of
σ, is convinced that:
1. the platform has a DAA Certificate (A, e, v) from a specific DAA Issuer,
and hence it is a genuine TPM containing a legitimate EK; this is accom-
plished by a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a set of values f,A, e
and v such that AeRfSv ≡ Z (mod n);
2. a message, m, was signed by the TPM using its DAA secret, f , where
f is the same as the value in the DAA Certificate (used in step 1); if m
includes an AIK public key, then the AIK originates from a genuine TPM.
In summary, once a platform (TPM) has obtained a DAA Certificate (which
only needs to be done once), it is able to subsequently DAA-Sign as many AIKs
as its wishes, without involving the DAA Issuer.
3.3.3 Variable Anonymity
Anonymity and unlinkability are provided to a user by using two parameters:
ζ, also referred to as the Base, and the AIK. The choice of the base directly
affects the degree of anonymity afforded to a TPM user. If perfect anonymity is
desired, then a different, random base value should be used for every interaction
with a verifier. Conversely, if the same base value is used for every interaction
with a verifier, then the verifier can identify that this is the same TPM. In
addition, if the same base value is used to interact with different verifiers, then
they are able to correlate the activities of a particular TPM. (A more detailed
discussion of the effects of choices of base values is given in [54]).
As discussed in section 3.1, a TPM is capable of generating multiple platform
identities, simply by generating different AIK key pairs. Different AIKs may
therefore be used to interact with different verifiers so that the actions of a TPM
are unlinkable (provided the base is different).
4 PDE security
Pervasive availability of a user’s devices is central to the PDE concept, as stated
in section 2.1. This means that subnetworks of a PDE use whatever communica-
tions and access networks are available to maintain connectivity. This introduces
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complex management problems; for example, determining the most appropriate
network to use when there are several choices [22, 23] is in itself a non-trivial
problem. In this section we focus on the security issues that arise from such
an architecture, and then discuss ways of addressing some of these issues using
trusted computing functionality.
4.1 Security issues
The following procedures need to be defined as part of the overall PDE system
definition:
• Secure initialisation of a PDE,
• Secure home device registration,
• Secure foreign device registration,
• Secure negotiation protocols within the Digital Marketplace, and
• Secure content download.
The first stage of secure initialisation includes creating and registering a
user with a PDE service provider [50]. The user is then in a position to register
home and foreign devices — this process includes populating the DME registers
with a globally unique PDE identifer for each device, and storing a set of secu-
rity credentials for each device. Credentials are stored for both PDE-to-device
and device-to-device mutual authentication protocols, and for logging into the
local domains that the device is authorised to operate in. Note that, in the
case of home devices, these credentials can be used to support a single-sign-on
capability. The same information is stored for any foreign devices registered.
The Digital Marketplace is a suite of negotiation protocols designed to man-
age the provision of third party services; these could be used, for example, in
a market for network access, or a market for downloadable content. Goo et al.
[22, 23] define security mechanisms for the negotiation protocol suite.
Gallery and Tomlinson [18] propose a pair of protocols, one based on public
key cryptography and the other on the use of secret keys, that service providers
can use to protect the download of proprietary conditional access software to
their subscribers. It is proposed that the conditional access software is encrypted
with a secret key, and that this software is then downloaded onto the user’s
device (if it is not already present). The user’s device is assumed to be equipped
with trusted computing software and hardware, including a TPM.
In the public key based protocol, a download application agent on the user’s
device requests its TPM to measure the current platform state, and create a
public key pair that is ‘sealed’ to the resulting integrity measurements. The
TPM creates a certificate for the associated public key and the integrity mea-
surements, and this is sent to the service provider.
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On verifying the certificate5, the service provider has information on which
to make an informed decision about whether the user’s device contains soft-
ware that could circumvent any conditional access protection applied to content
delivered to that device. If the service provider is satisfied with the provided
integrity metrics, then it can use the public key to encrypt data objects in
the knowledge that the associated TPM will only decrypt them if the platform
state matches that represented by the integrity measurements. In this case,
the service provider encrypts two symmetric keys, one to decrypt the encrypted
conditional access software, and a second to verify the software’s data integrity.
The secret key version of the protocol works in a similar way, but in this
case the two symmetric keys are derived from a secret key agreed between the
application download agent and the service provider, using the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement protocol. The two keys are stored in the device TPM and sealed
to the platform state.
4.2 User perspective
We next investigate how other aspects of the PDE can be made robust from
the user’s perspective, using trusted computing functionality. In particular we
investigate remote device integrity assurance and device revocation.
Trusted computing has often been viewed as a tool primarily designed to
enable remote parties to control the handling of their data on user machines,
e.g. for content owners to protect the use of proprietary content, as described
in the overview above, or, for organisations to manage the dissemination of
sensitive data. Indeed, this type of use has been the main source of some of
the criticisms of the technology (see, for example, [1]). However, as we now
describe, trusted computing can also be utilised by users as a means to protect
their own devices connected in a PDE.
4.2.1 Remote device integrity assurance
Whilst a PDE offers many distributed computing benefits, it also introduces
many vulnerabilities. Since the devices in a PDE will vary in terms of capability,
it is likely that the level of protection for devices will also vary; some devices
may be more prone to malicious physical or network attacks than others. It
would be extremely useful to alert a user of potential attacks on their PDE,
much like the warnings provided by current personal firewall software. Such a
service would be particularly useful for remote devices where the user may not
be able to physically intervene.
Trusted computing can be used to detect whether or not a PDE device has
undergone modification; this can be achieved using the integrity measuring ca-
pability and attestation mechanisms provided by trusted computing, as outlined
in section 3. Additional mechanisms are needed to determine if modifications
5It is assumed that there is a public key infrastructure in place, so that the service provider
can access a certified copy of the TPM’s public key.
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are authorised, unauthorised but harmless, or unauthorised and represent a
threat to PDE security.
During the process of adding a home device to a PDE [50], the PDE initial-
isation agent can also request the device’s TPM to measure the platform state.
The resulting integrity measurements can be uploaded to the local DME, and,
if possible, to the root DME. This process should ideally be preceded by a scan
for viruses and malicious software on the device, alerting the user and possi-
bly preventing the device from joining the PDE if such software is found. The
platform image can be distributed to all local DMEs; this will mean that the
DME had an initial platform image that it can compare with future attestation
images from the same device. Modifications to a device that are not authorised
by the user will change subsequent integrity measurements, allowing the DME
to detect and react to any changes.
Attestation of platform state could be made periodically or on demand. On-
demand attestation could be requested before any remote operation involving
sensitive data, such as the transfer of personal data. If direct connectivity to
a particular PDE device is not available, but communication can be routed
via a number of devices to the end target, then transitive attestation can be
performed — each device on the communications route attests to its platform
state to the device upstream towards the local DME. This creates an attestation
chain which is valid if, and only if, the attestation image of each device has not
changed from the stored value.
If devices are to upload integrity measurements periodically, then this could
be most efficiently achieved by devices attesting to the local DME, which can
then update the root DME on a less frequent basis. This allows a local DME
to readily detect and swiftly react to a device in its subnetwork that has been
modified. If and when connectivity to the root DME is present, then the local
DME can alert the root DME of the device that caused the alert. Using the
transitive attestation method described above, the root DME requests that the
reporting local DME attests to its platform state, in order to determine whether
the local DME has itself been modified and can be trusted. If a remote device is
believed to have been modified, then an alert is sent to the user and the remote
device can be revoked from the PDE until a user intervenes, e.g. to re-initialise
the device — this procedure is discussed further in the next section.
Foreign devices can also be monitored using the same attestation techniques,
but, in this case, state verification might take place on a more frequent basis
because of the higher risks that they pose. On initialisation, a foreign device
attests to its platform state to the local DME of the subnetwork to which the
device has connected. The local DME, perhaps through the root DME, could
use a web service that verifies whether or not the image of the foreign device
can be trusted. Periodic attestation can then be used to monitor the foreign
device while it is connected to the user’s PDE. In this case, responsibility
for terminating a connection to a foreign device suspected of being modified is
delegated to the local DME.
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4.2.2 Device revocation
Just as in a conventional network, a PDE and its devices are vulnerable to
attacks in which a compromised device is used to conduct attacks on the rest
of the network. Therefore, a fundamental requirement is that the compromise
of a single device should not affect the whole PDE. When a modified device
is detected, as described above, this device could be temporarily revoked from
the PDE until a user intervenes, e.g. to re-initialise the device. Furthermore,
this should apply even if multiple devices, perhaps even a whole subnetwork,
are compromised simultaneously.
PDE access can be controlled using key management, in particular, through
the use of a secret PDE group key that is distributed to PDE devices, via the
local DMEs, from the root DME. Additional secret keys for mechanisms such
as confidentiality and data integrity can then be derived from this key. The
controlled use and update of this key would enable the root DME to enforce
PDE access control, where only those devices in possession of the current group
key are able to participate in PDE communication. By changing the PDE group
key whenever a potentially compromised device is detected, such a device could
be prevented from accessing future communication. Conversely, the PDE group
key can also be refreshed whenever a new device joins the PDE, so that the new
device is prevented from accessing past PDE communication.
In the previous section, we suggested that, when devices are initialised, their
platform integrity measurements could be stored by the root DME, and also each
local DME. In addition, the initialisation agent of a device could request the
TPM to create a non-migratable key pair that is bound to the platform state.
The TPM could certify the public key and platform measurements and the
result could then be sent to the root DME. This is analogous to the download
application agent sending the same data objects to a service provider in the
software download protocols proposed by Gallery and Tomlinson (see above).
As a result, the root DME would know the public key bound to the platform
state of each device; the root DME could issue key updates encrypted with the
public keys of the devices hosting a local DME. If a local DME device has been
modified then it will not be able to decrypt the key update designated for it. In
this case, another device in the subnetwork can take over as the local DME host;
it could indicate this by presenting an update message that is both encrypted
using the latest PDE group key and signed by the root DME.
Since a subnetwork may not always be online and accessible by the root
DME, each local DME is responsible for maintaining a subnetwork key encrypt-
ing key. This is used to encrypt and deliver the PDE group key update to
unmodified devices. The same key distribution method can be used for root
DME to local DME key distribution, so that modified PDE devices will not be
able to recover the subnetwork key in order to retrieve PDE group key update
data. If scalability is required, i.e. to cope with the possibility that the num-
ber of PDE devices in a subnetwork becomes large, then multicast key update
techniques can be used (see, for example, [57, 58, 59]).
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5 Secure and Private Service Discovery
Before a user can access and consume a service, the service will first need to
be discovered via a service discovery process. Service discovery is an essential
precursor to the process of service provisioning. Securing the process of service
discovery is equally important, in order to protect the interests and privacy of
both users and service providers. Many service discovery schemes have been
proposed for ubiquitous environments (see, for example, [12, 16, 60]), but none
addresses the issues of user security and privacy.
We describe below one way in which trusted computing functionality, specif-
ically IMSR and DAA, can be used to preserve user privacy whilst securing the
process of service discovery in a mobile ubiquitous environment. We first discuss
the security and privacy issues arising from service discovery. We then intro-
duce Ninja, a privacy preserving authentication scheme for ubiquitous service
discovery, proposed in [31]. Finally we provide a brief analysis and discussion
of this latter scheme.
5.1 Service Discovery Security Issues
A variety of security and privacy threats apply to service discovery, from which
corresponding security requirements are derived.
5.1.1 Security Threats
Threats applying to service discovery include the following.
1. Spoofing: A malicious entity could masquerade as a legitimate service
provider or service user, either by sending false service advertisements or
false service requests. This could, for example, be achieved using replay
or man-in-the-middle attacks.
2. Information Disclosure
(a) User’s Personally Identifiable Information (PII): During the
process of service discovery, a user’s PII, such as his/her identity
(e.g. in the form of a long lived key) or physical location, might
be revealed (either willingly or unwillingly) to a service provider or
passive eavesdropper.
(b) Service Information (SI): By observing the service information
exchanged by a user and service provider (e.g. the types of service
request), a passive adversary could build up a profile of the user. This
information could be used later to predict future patterns and habits
of the user. The privacy of the user is potentially compromised as a
result.
3. Profile Linking: Colluding service providers could buy, sell or exchange
information about their users or customers. This could not only provide
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service providers with monetary benefits, but also enhance their business
intelligence and gain competitive advantage, e.g. if they are able to build
more comprehensive user profiles (with or without user permission). Fi-
nally, the consequences for user privacy could be even more serious if a
TTP colludes with service providers.
4. Encouragement of Rogue Behaviour: With the knowledge that pri-
vacy enhancing technologies are employed to protect their identities, users
may be tempted to ‘misbehave’ or act maliciously, since it may be difficult
or even impossible for service providers to determine who is misbehaving.
5.1.2 Security Requirements
From the above threat analysis, we derive the following corresponding security
and privacy requirements:
• Mutual Authentication: This is one of the most important require-
ments because it can prevent spoofing (by either malicious users or ma-
licious service providers). Any mutual authentication scheme should also
be designed to prevent replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. To protect
privacy, a user may want to remain anonymous to a service provider. So,
instead of authenticating his/her identity to a service provider, the user
may want to somehow prove or authenticate his/her ‘trustworthiness’ to
the service provider.
• User Anonymity: Unique user identifying information (e.g. an iden-
tifier or a long lived key) should not be divulged to a service provider
during service discovery. A user may interact with service providers using
a pseudonym.
• Service Information Confidentiality: To further preserve the pri-
vacy of the user, service information originating from the user may be
encrypted.
• Unlinkability: Colluding service providers should not be able to link the
activities of a user. Similarly, when a TTP colludes with a service provider,
they should not be able to correlate the actions of a particular user. In
other words, it should be impossible for colluding service providers to tell
if two sets of prior service transactions (made with different providers)
involved the same or different user(s).
• Transaction Linkability/History: For billing or other purposes, it may
be necessary for a service provider to maintain the transaction histories
of its users. A service provider may thus need to be able to determine
whether a particular user is a repeat user (and, if so, which one) or a first
time user, whilst still being unable to determine the unique identity of the
user. This is not always a requirement, and providing it may require user
consent.
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• Rogue Blacklisting: Service providers should be able to identify and
blacklist malicious and untrustworthy hosts.
5.1.3 The Security Challenges
A mutual authentication scheme meeting all the above requirements is there-
fore required. This is particularly challenging for several reasons. Conventional
mutual authentication schemes normally require the user identity to be authen-
ticated to a verifier. But, in this environment, user privacy is a priority, and
so user anonymity is required during authentication. How then can we con-
vince a service provider that an anonymous user is trustworthy? Also, if user
anonymity is provided, can we detect malicious or illegitimate users? We are, in
fact, trying to achieve security and privacy concurrently, whilst protecting the
interests of both users and service providers. This challenge has been addressed
by the scheme we describe immediately below.
5.2 The Ninja Authentication Scheme
To address the above challenge, Ninja, a privacy preserving authentication
scheme for service discovery has been proposed [31]. This scheme uses two
trusted computing functionalities, namely IMSR and DAA, and offers the fol-
lowing security and privacy properties: user anonymity, service information
confidentiality and unlinkability.
The scheme has three phases (as shown in Figure 4). We briefly describe the
workings of each phase. Full details of the protocol can be found in [31].
Figure 4: The Ninja Authentication Scheme
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Join Phase The Join Phase enables a platform to obtain a DAA Certificate
from a DAA Issuer. At a later time the platform can use this DAA Certificate,
in the mutual authentication phase, to anonymously authenticate itself to a
service provider. As shown in Figure 4, the entities involved are the Platform
and the DAA Issuer. Since the Join Phase is identical to the DAA Join Protocol
specified in [8], we do not discuss it further here. Note that the Join Phase may
have taken place before a device is shipped to the user.
Mutual Authentication Phase Service discovery typically involves the ex-
change of service advertisement and service reply messages between a user and
service provider. To avoid increasing the communication overheads, the (pri-
vacy preserving) authentication mechanisms are incorporated into these service
messages. In other words, service discovery and mutual authentication take
place concurrently.
We now examine how the goal of mutual authentication is achieved through
these service messages. As shown in Figure 4, the mutual authentication process
is initiated by the service provider through an authenticated service advertise-
ment message. In other words, the service provider sends a signed copy of
its service advertisement to prospective users. Also sent in this message are
the public key certificate of the service provider and the public Diffie-Hellman
parameters which are used to established a shared secret with the user.
Suppose that a prospective user receives the above service advertisement
(via his/her platform), and is interested in the advertised service. The user’s
platform then authenticates the service provider by verifying the signature on
the advertisement. If the verification outcome is satisfactory, then, at this point,
the service provider is authenticated to the user. Using the platform, and via a
service reply message (as shown in step 5 of Figure 4), the user now anonymously
authenticates itself (i.e. its trustworthiness) to the service provider using the
following procedure.
1. It generates an AIK key pair.
2. It retrieves its integrity metrics and signs them using the private part of
the AIK (generated in step 1).
3. It computes a DAA Signature on the public part of the AIK.
4. It generates its own Diffie-Hellman exponent and computes a shared key
K.
5. It then constructs the service reply message, which includes the integrity
metrics and corresponding signature, the public part of the AIK, and the
DAA signature.
6. It encrypts the service reply message and computes a MAC on the en-
crypted service reply.
7. It then sends the service provider the encrypted service reply, the MAC,
and the platform’s public Diffie-Hellman value.
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Verification Phase On receiving a service reply message from a platform,
the service provider SP performs the following steps to verify the platform’s
trustworthiness.
1. It computes the shared key K, and checks the integrity of the received
message (i.e. it checks the MAC on the encrypted service reply).
2. Using K, it decrypts the encrypted service reply message.
3. From this, it obtains the DAA Signature. The service provider verifies
this signature, and is thereby convinced that the platform possesses a
legitimate DAA Certificate.
4. It also verifies the trustworthiness of the device (i.e. by verifying the signa-
ture on the integrity metrics and checking that these metrics correspond
to a trusted software state).
5. If the service provider is satisfied with the integrity measurements, then
the platform is authenticated to SP.
When being authenticated by another service provider, the user platform
should generate a new AIK key pair, but only needs to repeat the mutual
authentication phase, i.e. it does not need to perform the join phase again.
5.3 Analysis and Discussion
The Ninja authentication scheme meets all the security requirements identified
above. A more detailed security analysis can be found in [31]. We conclude
this section by briefly discussing why this scheme is appropriate for a mobile
ubiquitous environment.
Firstly, as shown in Figure 4, mutual authentication between a service
provider and user is achieved using a two-message exchange. This is partic-
ulary efficient in terms of communications overhead. The other advantage of
Ninja is that, once a user has obtained a DAA Certificate from a DAA Issuer
(which only needs to be done once), it is able to generate verifiable pseudonyms
(i.e. the AIK key pairs) on its own, and interact with multiple service providers
whilst protecting user privacy and preventing linking of transactions.
This scheme provides one example of how trusted computing can help pro-
vide security and privacy for the service discovery process. It remains of interest
to consider what other approaches might be devised to achieve similar objectives
— indeed, trusted computing has a very rich set of functionality, and it seems
inevitable that any problem can be solved in a variety of ways.
6 Content Distribution Protection—Using Trusted
Computing
We next consider how trusted computing can help provide content protection
in a mobile distributed environment. In particular we consider an example of
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a trusted computing based anonymous watermarking scheme for content distri-
bution, proposed in [32]. As discussed in section 2.2, one of the key motivations
for the design of this scheme was to reduce reliance on an online Trusted Third
Party (TTP). This is fundamentally important because an online TTP may not
always be available in a mobile ubiquitous environment.
We begin with a review of the content distribution protection security issues
affecting content consumers and content providers. We then go on to describe
the operation of the scheme in greater detail, followed by a brief analysis.
6.1 Content Distribution Protection Security Issues
We start by examining the security issues arising from content distribution
protection.
6.1.1 A CDP Threat Model
Potential security threats to content consumers (referred to below as ‘buyers’)
and content providers include the following.
1. Illegal Content Distribution: A malicious user might distribute con-
tent without authorisation from the content owner (the content may have
earlier been legally purchased from a content provider). This could result
in the content being used by others without the appropriate payment be-
ing made to the content provider. This translates to a potential loss of
revenue for the content provider.
2. Framing: To deter unauthorised content distribution, the content provider
can use a digital watermarking scheme, where a unique seller-generated
watermark is embedded into every piece of content purchased by the buyer.
Such a scheme, however, does not prevent an honest buyer from being
falsely accused (framed) of unauthorised content distribution. This is a
problem if there is no way for the buyer to challenge the decision and
prove his/her innocence.
3. Information Disclosure
• Buyer’s Personally Identifiable Information (PII): During the
process of content purchase, a buyer’s PII, such as his/her identity or
physical location, might be revealed (either willingly or unwillingly)
to a content provider or passive eavesdropper.
• Content Information: By observing the type of content that a
buyer purchases, a passive adversary might gradually build up a pro-
file of the buyer. This information may later be used to infer or
predict future patterns and habits of the buyer. The privacy of the
buyer is potentially compromised as a result.
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4. Profile Linking: Colluding content providers might buy, sell or exchange
information about their clients. Such collusion could not only provide
content providers with monetary benefits, but also enhance their business
intelligence as they are able to build a more comprehensive profile of their
customers. With the aid of a TTP, buyers can employ privacy enhanc-
ing mechanisms to protect their identity when they interact with content
providers. The consequences for buyer privacy could be even more serious
if such a TTP decides to collude with content providers.
6.1.2 CDP Security Requirements
We can derive a corresponding set of security requirements from the above list
of threats.
1. Framing Resistance: It should not be possible for the content provider
to falsely accuse an honest buyer of unauthorised content distribution.
2. User Anonymity: Unique identifying information for a buyer (such as
a long lived key) should not be divulged to a content provider during the
content purchasing process. A buyer may interact with content providers
using pseudonyms.
3. Content Information Confidentiality: Eavesdroppers on the commu-
nications between a buyer and content provider should not be able to
determine the type of content that is being purchased by the buyer.
4. Unlinkability: Colluding content providers should not be able to link
the activities of the same buyer. Similarly, when a TTP colludes with
a content provider, they should not be able to correlate the actions of a
particular buyer. In other words, it should be impossible for colluding
content providers to tell if two sets of prior content purchase transactions
(made with different providers) have originated from the same or different
buyers.
5. Transaction History: For billing or other purposes (e.g. loyalty re-
wards), it may be necessary for a content provider to maintain the trans-
action histories of its buyers. That is, a content provider may need to be
able to identify whether a particular buyer is a repeat buyer (and, if so,
which one) or a first time buyer, whilst still being unable to determine the
unique identity of the buyer.
6. Blacklisting of Rogue Buyers: In the event that illegal copies of copy-
righted content are found (e.g. on the Internet), content providers should
be able to blacklist the buyers that purchased these copies of the content.
6.2 The Watermarking Scheme
We now present the anonymous content distribution protection watermarking
scheme given in [32]. This scheme is designed to enable a buyer to anonymously
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purchase digital content, whilst allowing a seller to blacklist any buyer platforms
that are distributing content illegally. Using the IMSR and DAA TC function-
ality, the scheme also allows a buyer to generate verifiable pseudonyms, and to
convince a content provider that the buyer generated watermark is well formed,
without the involvement of a TTP. The scheme is also designed to meet all the
security requirements set out in section 6.1.
First, we introduce the entities participating in the protocol. Next, we state
the assumptions upon which the scheme is based. Finally, we describe the
operation of the scheme.
6.2.1 The Entities
The entities participating in the scheme are:
• the buyer of digital content (e.g. music, video, podcasts, etc.);
• the platform, consisting of the TPM and its host — the platform is also
the device which a content buyer will use to interact with other entities;
• the seller (also referred to as the content provider) of digital content;
• the DAA Issuer, i.e. the authority that issues DAA Certificates to legit-
imate platforms.
6.2.2 Assumptions
The correct working of scheme relies upon a number of assumptions.
• Using an out of band mechanism, such as the one given in [19]), the content
buyer is already authenticated to the platform that is used for the CDP
watermarking scheme. The buyer and the platform will collectively be
referred to as the Buyer Platform.
• The device/platform running the CDP scheme is equipped with TCG func-
tionality conforming to v1.2 of the TCG specifications [55] (see Section 3).
• The parties involved have agreed on the use of a homomorphic encryption
algorithm EncK(·) (e.g. the Paillier probabilistic encryption scheme [42]
that is homomorphic with respect to addition).
• The embedding operation ⊗ (as used to embed a watermark in a piece
of content) is public knowledge, and the security of the embedding relies
on the key used to embed the watermark W . (In this case the key is a
random permutation ρ). In addition, the watermark W embedded with ⊗
is collusion resistant, which means that it is computationally infeasible for
the attackers to remove W by comparing different copies of the content.
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Table 1: Notation
Notation Description
BP The Buyer Platform
S The Seller or Content Provider
DI The DAA Issuer
f A DAA secret value generated by the TPM
IDA The identity of a principal, A
(EKpk ,EKsk ) The pair of Public and Private Endorsement Keys
(AIKpk ,AIKsk ) A pair of Public and Private Attestation Identity Keys
X′ Watermarked Content
X ⊗W Embed W into X with the embedding operation, ⊗
ρ A random permutation function
H A cryptographic hash-function
EncK (M ) The encryption of a message, M , using the key K
DecK (M ) The decryption of a message, M , using the key K
SigK (M ) A signature on a message, M , created using the key K
6.2.3 The Scheme
Before describing the scheme, it is first necessary to introduce some notation
(see Table 1).
The CDP watermarking scheme involves three distinct phases (as shown in
Figure 5), namely, the Join Phase, the Watermarking Phase, and the Content
Acquisition Phase. We now describe each phase in greater detail.
Figure 5: An Anonymous Watermarking Scheme using Trusted Computing
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Join Phase The objective of the Join Phase is for a buyer platform to obtain
a DAA Certificate from a DAA Issuer. Since the Join Phase of the scheme
is identical to the DAA Join Protocol of section 3.2, we do not describe the
sequence of Join Phase steps. Note that the Join Phase may have taken place
before a device is shipped to the content buyer.
Watermarking Phase The aim of this phase is for a buyer to contribute a
watermark, and for the seller to embed the buyer’s watermark into a piece of
proprietary content. The entities involved in this phase are the Buyer Platform,
BP and the Seller, S. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. BP generates a watermark,W , using the watermark generation function of
a reliable watermarking algorithm (e.g. the spread spectrum watermarking
algorithm given in [14]).
2. BP generates an encryption key pair (BEKpk ,BEKsk ), and encrypts the
watermark, W , using BEKpk, to create:
EncBEKPK (W ).
3. BP (i.e. the TPM) generates a non-migratable signing key pair (BSKpk ,BSKsk ).
BP then signs the encrypted watermark, EncBEKpk (W ) (from step 2), and
BEK pk, to obtain:
SigBSKsk (EncBEKpk (W ),BEKpk ).
4. BP generates an AIK key pair, (AIK pk ,AIK sk ).
5. BP retrieves the Stored Measurement Log (SML), and the corresponding
Platform Configuration Register (PCR) values. BP then signs the PCR
values using AIK sk (from step 4):
SigAIKsk (PCR).
The SML and PCR values provide evidence that a particular watermarking
algorithm was used (by the buyer) to generate the watermark.
6. BP computes ζ = H(IDS ). It then creates a pseudonym, Nv = ζf (where
f is the DAA Secret generated during the join phase) for use when inter-
acting with the seller.
7. To prove (to the seller) that the AIK (from step 4) originates from a gen-
uine TPM, the platform DAA-Signs AIKpk using f , the DAA Certificate,
and the other public parameters of the system. The output of DAA Sign
is the DAA Signature, σ (which also includes ζ and Nv).
8. To prove that BSK originates from the TPM, BP signs (certifies) BSKpk
using AIKsk :
SigAIKsk (BSKpk ).
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9. BP sends the following to the Seller:
BP → S :EncBEKpk (W ),AIKpk ,BSKpk ,BEKpk ,
σ,SigBSKsk (EncBEKpk (W ),BEKpk ),
SigAIKsk (BSKpk ),SML,SigAIKsk (PCR).
On receiving the last message from the buyer, and, to subsequently incor-
porate the buyer’s watermark into a piece of content, the seller S performs the
following steps:
1. Verifies the DAA Signature, σ, and is thus convinced that:
• BP is in possession of a legitimate DAA Certificate from a specific
DAA Issuer, which implies that a genuine TPM is contained in BP.
• AIKpk was signed using BP ’s DAA Secret, f . Even though the value
of f is never revealed to the seller, the seller knows that the value is
related to the one in the DAA Certificate.
2. Examines the integrity measurements of the buyer platform. This is
achieved by recursively hashing the values in the SML, and then com-
paring the result with the corresponding PCR values. If the outcome is
satisfactory, the seller is convinced that a reliable watermarking algorithm
was used by the buyer platform to generate its watermark, W .
3. Verifies SigAIKsk (BSKpk ).
4. Verifies SigBSKsk (EncBEKpk (W ),BEKpk ).
5. Generates a seller watermark, V , and then embeds it into the Content,
X, to create:
X ′ = X ⊗ V.
6. Encrypts X ′ (from step 3) using BEKpk to obtain:
E(X ′) = EncBEKpk(X
′).
7. Permutes EncBEKpk(W ) (received from buyer) to obtain E(ρW ).
8. The permuted watermark is then embedded into X ′ as follows:
E(X ′ ⊗ ρW ) = E(X ′)⊗ E(ρW ),
which follows because of the homomorphic property of the encryption
algorithm.
9. The encrypted, watermarked content is then sent back to the buyer.
S → BP : E(X ′ ⊗ ρW ).
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Content Acquisition Phase When the buyer receives the encrypted, wa-
termarked content, E(X ′ ⊗ ρW ), from the seller, the buyer decrypts it using
BEK sk, to retrieve the watermarked content:
(X ′ ⊗ ρW ).
The watermarked content is now ready for consumption (e.g. viewing or
listening) by the buyer.
6.3 Analysis and Discussion
The watermarking scheme presented here meets all the security requirements
identified earlier in section 6.1. The interested reader is referred to [32] for a
more detailed security analysis. This watermarking scheme is suitable for use
in a mobile ubiquitous environment for the following reasons.
Firstly, as mentioned in section 2.2, having access to an online TTP may
not be feasible in such an environment. To protect privacy, and using DAA, a
buyer only has to interact with the DAA Issuer (the online TTP here) once,
and he/she can subsequently generate verifiable pseudonyms on his/her own
and interact with buyers.
Secondly, the scheme is extremely efficient in terms of communications over-
head, because only two messages need to be exchanged between the content
buyer and a seller. In a mobile environment, where users are predominantly
using resource constrained devices, communications efficiency is an important
feature.
6.4 The Future
We have presented just one example of a scheme exploiting the features offered
by trusted computing for the purpose of protecting content distributed to mo-
bile devices. If trusted computing functionality becomes as widespread as is
commonly expected, then a variety of other such schemes are likely to be pro-
posed. This appears to be an area of considerable promise for future research
and exploitation.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have considered three ways in which trusted computing can help to address
some of the most pressing security and privacy issues arising in future mobile
ubiquitous networks. However, there are doubtless many other ways in which
trusted computing can be exploited to help provide security for future mobile
networks. If trusted computing technology becomes as ubiquitous as is envisaged
by the technology’s developers, then this is clearly an area of huge importance
for the future. TPMs are already present in very large numbers of PCs on sale
today, and it seems only a matter of time before similar functionality spreads
to a wide range of mobile computing devices.
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Other work on exploiting trusted computing functionality to provide security
in mobile ubiquitous computing environments is already emerging. The work
of Balfe, Lakhani and Paterson [4, 5] on using trusted computing to provide
stable addresses in a peer-to-peer environment, and hence avoid Sybil attacks,
has already been mentioned in section 1. The use of trusted computing’s attes-
tation mechanisms to detect node compromise in wireless sensor networks [29]
has been proposed by Krauß, Stumpf and Eckrt. Other relevant work includes
the efforts of the Mobile Phone Working Group of the TCG, as outlined in
[17], the work of Kinateder and Pearson on using trusted computing to sup-
port a distributed reputation system [28], the use of trusted computing for
securing the access, distribution and storage of confidential documents in a net-
worked enterprise environments for mobile workers [51], as proposed by Sevinc¸,
Strasser and Basin, and the possible use of trusted computing functionality to
provide greater security for end nodes in peer-to-peer networks, as discussed by
Schechter, Greenstadt and Smith [49].
Like any other technological innovation, trusted computing is no silver bul-
let. The technology is still evolving, and open issues remain. One such issue,
highlighted by McCune et al. [33], is the turtle problem, i.e. the problem of es-
tablishing the first point of trust for the purpose of user based attestation in a
network environment. Another area of considerable recent interest involves pos-
sible means of generalising the attestation mechanism, which is seen by many as
too coarse and difficult to manage. Such work includes Shi et al.’s fine-grained
code attestation [52], and property-based attestation [26, 47].
One technology likely to be fundamental to the deployment of trusted com-
puting in general purpose computing platforms is virtualisation. This technology
provides the ability to run multiple ‘virtual machines’ (VMs) on one physical
platform, managed by a ‘hypervisor’ or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). Each
virtual machine hosts a self-contained operating system or task-specific software.
The VMs are isolated from each other, and one VM cannot access memory space
allocated to another VM — the VMM ensures this with assistance from hard-
ware enhancements. For example, Intel’s LaGrande technology [24] provides
hardware support enabling the creation of secure (and measurable) compart-
ments for virtual machines. Virtualisation can be used to enhance the security
properties of a trusted platform — for example, Haldar et al. [26] have proposed
methods for extending platform integrity measuring to virtual machines.
Indeed, trusted computing could become a ubiquitous security infrastruc-
ture, used routinely in the provision of almost every security service — indeed,
this would appear to be part of the vision of the TCG (see, for example, [45]). It
therefore would seem prudent to further explore ways in which such technology
can be exploited to solve some of the most difficult problems facing users and
designers of ubiquitous computing systems, not least such issues as user privacy
and trust establishment.
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